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• 
CAN TREA1Y lAW BE SUPREME, DIRECTLY 
EFFECTIVE, AND AUTONOMOUS ALL AT THE 
SAME TIME? 
(AN EPISTOlARY EXC . GE) 
RicHARD STITH* & J.H.H. WEILER** 
INTRooucTION To THE CoRREsPONDENCE 
The European Court ofjustice has long insisted that the 
law emerging from the European Community treaties is su-
preme over national law, directly effective as to individuals, 
and :autonomous or independent of national constitutions. 
One of us asserted in a letter to the other, in early 2000, that 
such tripartite unity is impossible, that one of the three ele-
ments must be absent as a matter of logic, without regard to 
the actual wording of the European treaties. Our ensuing de-
bate by correspondence ended on normative matters concern-
ing the value of national and supranational constitutions. 
Having been translated and published in Spain in Dos visiones 
norteamericanas de la jurisdicci6n de la Union Europea, we present 
it here · for the interest and, we hope, enjoyment of English-
speaking students of European law. 
One prefatory clarification: The first issue discussed be-
low concerns substantive treaty law, not th.e frequently dis-
cussed question "Who has the right to interpret treaty law?" 
(the question of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz). Treaty law may 
come before a national court, before an inter- or suprana-
tional court, or simply into a university classroom. Wherever it 
appears, we may ask whether it is and/ or can be at once su-
preme, directly effe.ctive, and autonomous . 
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; richard.stith@ 
valpo.edu. 
** University Professor and Jean Monnet Chair, New York University. 
Director, Global Law School Program, New York University School of Law; 
weiler@jeanmonnetprogram.org. 
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January 17, 2000 
Professor Joseph H.H. Weiler 
HaiVard ,Law School 
Cambridge, :MA 02138 
Dear Professor Weiler: 
[Vol. 34:729 
Your CoNSTITU .. fiON OF EuROPE is most enjoyable for me and 
the students in my "European Federalism" course. Thank you 
for ptitting it all together. 
Yet something seems to me missing in your response to Theo-
dor Schilling. You write as though it were possible for a treaty 
(or for its authorized interpretator) to be autonomous and di-
rectly effective as well as supreme. 
In a nutshell, my thesis to the contrary is that European Com-
munity law (or any analogous body of law springing originally 
from the cot1sent of nations) can have any two of the following 
three characteristics, but not all three. supremacy, autonomy 
(meaning that only the treaty and other international sources 
of law are decisive), and direct effect. 
Supremacy plus atttonomy go easily together, imposing duties 
only on states and leaving direct effect dualistically up to do-
mestic constitutional or statutory rules. (This is the old EC 
Article 169 etc. approach). Autonomy plus direct effect also 
make sense together, as long as the question of supremacy is 
decided domestically. And even supremacy and direct effect 
are ut1problematic, as long as autonomy is surrendered in 
favor of consideration of international and domestic law as a 
single system. · (For example, the European Court of Justice 
could have responded to Germany's Solange Las the Advocate 
General once proposed, by taking into account national con-
stitution-al law limits on treaty authority before issuing ECJ 
opinions thus surrendering the automony of EC law.) But 
there is no logical way that the ECJ can treat EC law as su-
preme, autonomous, and directly effective. 
Let me illustrate with an example I developed last summer 
while lecturing on these matters in Spain. Let us suppose that 
don Carlos offers to sell the Eitfel Tower to don Jose for a 
million pesetas and the latter agrees to the deal. Here we have 
a contract (analogy to treaty) involving a surrender by don 
Carlos of something which he probably did not own under 
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property law (analogy to domestic constitutional law). Assum-
ing that don Carlos does not deliver, how can a court address 
the problem? 
The court can treat contract law as supreme and autonomotts 
(i11dependent of property law). That is, the court can order 
don Carlos to pay damages, without even inquiring into ques-
tions of property law or related reasons for the non-delivery. 
Or the court can treat contract law as atttonomous and directly 
effective in property law, by declaring that any interest don 
Carlos may have in the Eiffel Tower now belongs to don Jose, 
still withottt making any inquiries into actual ownership. The 
cottrt can even treat contract law as sttpreme and directly effec-
tive, finally settling the whole matter, but only if the court gives 
up tl1e autonomy of contract law and takes into account the 
original rights (or lack thereof) of don Carlos under property 
law. 
What the Court cannot do is limit itself to contract law (auton-
omy), declare that contract law binds regardless of property 
law (supremacy), and also insist on having a direct effect on 
property law by declaring that don jose is now the legal owner 
of the Eiffel Tower! Yet this is exactly what the ECJ does again 
and again (e.g., in Costa v. E.N.E.L.), claiming supremacy, au-
tonomy, and direct effect over matters that depend originally 
on do1nestic co.nstitutional arguments. 
What should a Member State, or a high court of a Member 
State, do when faced with such an order by the ECJ? I think it 
can do only what don Carlos and don jose would have to do if 
faced with a declaration that don Jose had become the owner 
of the Eiffel Tower. Since this result is logically impossible, the 
court's order can only be interpreted to be the single logically 
possible directly effective mandate in disguise (i.e., a declara-
tion that all interests fortnerly held by don Carlos now belong 
to don Jose). 
In the EC context, domestic constitutional law would trump 
the ECJ, but not because of some supposed right of "auto-in-
terpretation" of the treaties. Rather, such a response would 
represent the maximum possible compliance with the ECJ 
compatible with logic and the rule of law. The national courts 
can do more than let the ECJ dispose of the limited powers 
given up in the treaties. 
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I would be most interested in. any. thoughts or comments you 
might have on the above. 
Sincerely, 
Richard Stith 
Professor of Law 
February 13, 2000 
Professor Richard Stith 
School of Law 
Valparaiso University 
Indiana 
Dear Colleague, 
• 
Thank you very much for your letter of January 17th. I am on 
sabbatical this year away from HaiVard so that mail sometimes 
reaches me erratically. 
Thank you too for your kind comments. I have thought about 
them a lot and inconclusively. ·The main problem I have is 
with the notion of autonomy. What exactly does it mean? 
What are its constitutional implications? In all my work, in-
cluding my reply to Schilling, I try to avoid using and certainly 
relying on autonomy as a legal category, though it is used 
widely, especially in the German literature, simply because I 
am never sure that I grasp what it means. 
If you define autonomy as meaning that only treaty and other 
international sources are relevant to the resolution of a legal 
issue, I still do not see why logically a system deriving from the 
consent of States cannot have all three elements. Rather than 
explain today why I think your hypo is not conclusive (I would 
be happy to do that in the future) I want to set up my own 
example for your conside.ration. 
Imagine a Treaty which had the following clauses: 
1. The High Contracting Parties. agree that all imports into 
any Treaty member will be classified and valued according to 
this Treaty and customs duties will be imposed by a schedule 
annexed to this Treaty. (substantive. obligation: common ex-
ternal tariff) 
2. Reaffirming the general principles of Public International 
Law, the High Contracting Parties agree that the provisions of 
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this Treaty will take precedence over any conflicting norm of a 
High Contracting Party. (supremacy) 
-3. So as to ensure the imposition of the same customs in all 
High Contracting Parties, the provisions of this Treaty, and 
this Treaty alone, will determine all matters concerning the 
classification, valuation and imposition of duties of imported 
goods to the exclusion of any other source of law unless it is 
recognized in this Treaty as a valid source. (autonomy) 
4. The High Contracting Parties also agree that the obligation 
contained in this Treaty will create rights for individuals which 
it is the duty of all national courts to apply in accordance with 
this Treaty (direct effect) including the duty of national courts 
to abide by the principles of autonomy and supremacy. 
5. To remove any doubts the High Contracting Parties declare 
that it is their express intention that this Treaty create a system 
that is autonomous, supreme, and produces direct effect. The 
High Contracting Parties also agree that depositing the act of 
ratification of this Treaty will constitute certification by a High 
Contracting Party that all internal obstacles, including consti-
tutional limitations, to the operation of this Treaty have been 
removed. The Treaty will come into force when all States de-
posit an act of ratification. 
Imagine now that this Treaty has come into force. Why, logi-
cally, would such a Treaty, based on the consent of States, not 
be o_ne which is autonomous, supreme, and produces direct 
effect? Whether the EU treaties are of such a nature is a mat-
ter of fact. But you seem to argue that it is not possible ipso 
. jure to have such a regime. That I fail to see. 
With all good wishes, 
Joseph Weiler 
p.s. Do you Email? 
March 6; 2000 
' . . 
Professor Joesph H.H. Weiler 
Harvard Law School 
Cambridge MA 02138 
Dear Professor Weiler: 
734 INTERNA110NAL l.AW AND P0Ll11CS [Vol. 34:729 
Thank you for your fax of February 13, responding at gener-
ous length to my letter of January 17 concerning problems re-
lated to don Carlos's transfer of tl1e Eifiel Tower. 
I'm afraid I;m not convinced. Let me address seriatim the 
points of view of domestic and of international law (viewpoints 
that I admittedly mixed together a bit in my earlier letter). 
Even a Treaty such as you describe, which is explicitly in-
tended to have supremacy, autonomy, and direct effect, would 
not have all three of these effects before a domestic tribunal. 
That tribunal would still depend on domestic law which 
means that, whatever the substantive outcome domestically, at 
least the "autonomy" of the Treaty would drop out in the 
course of local application. 
For example, as you suggest, let us suppose that the Treaty 
binds all parties to a common external tariff and declares that 
all internal constitutional obstacles have been overcome. But 
declaring do,es not make it so. Perhaps the domestic constitu-
tion g_rants various provinces the right to impose external tar-
iffs. (Perhaps this constitutional provision is even non-amend-
able.) If so, then no amount of inter11ational declaring wjll 
make this limit go away, any more tl1an a hundred contractual 
stipulations can make don Carlos able to sell the Eiffel Tower. 
Nemo dat quod non habet. One can't lift oneself by one's own 
bootstraps nor jump over one's own shadow., etc. 
Perhaps, of course, these limits do not exist, or can be over-
come, under domestic law. But my point is that domestic law 
must at least be consulted. This already makes Treaty law not 
autonomous, and the conclusion of the consultation may be 
that the Treaty is not supreme or directly effective either. 
As for the international or supranational point of view: Your 
hypothetical Treaty's certification that "all internal obsta-
cles ... have been removed" can be read two ways. It can be 
seen to be an evidentiary declaration concerning domestic law, 
in which case the autonomy of Treaty law is at least nominally 
wounded. Moreover, since such a declaration (despite its pro-
bative value) has an outside referent, the Treaty is in effect 
conceding that internal obstacles are possible, which wounds 
direct effect. (Domestic courts could thus use this very provi-
sion to buttress their resistance to the Treaty.) 
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The second way to understand the no-internal-obstacles provi-
sion is merely as a contractual stipulation wholly independent 
of domestic legal reality, just as don Carlos and don Jose could 
stipulate that in all future contractual litigation don Carlos 
shottld be irrebuttably presumed to have owned the Eiffel 
Tower prior to the contract. Autonomy is thus preserved, but 
direct effect is even more deeply wounded in that, in addition 
to the Treaty's concession of the possibility of internal obsta-
cles, there is now no evidence at all (not even a certification or 
declaration) that such obstacles do not exist. A tribunal oper-
ating with such blinders must know that it is adjudicating only 
international rights, not domestic 011es,just as a tribunal oper-
ating under the above presumption of Eiffel Tower ownership 
would know that it was not deciding actual ownership. 
Permit me to turn from the trees to the forest for a moment. 
What is at stake here for me is an essential foundation for lim-
ited government. Lockean:Jeffersonian political theory ends 
with limited state sovereignty because it begins with limited in-
dividual sovereignty, e.g., the inalienability of right~. (Hobbes 
can end with absolutism because he begins with unlimited lib-
erty.) In the same way, as the Maastricht decision makes clear, 
any hegemonic pretensions of the EU are undercut by the 
constitutional disabilities of the governments that created it. 
Of course, International Law has long irrebuttably presumed 
sovereignty to be absolute, or at least apparent authority to be 
actual authority. I ~ave no objection to this presumption as a 
simplifying prerequisite to a uniform order binding among na-
tions, but only among nations. In order to achieve direct do-
mestic effect, the ECJ has treated this possibly counterfactual 
presumption of absolute domestic sovereignty as a matter of 
political truth. By a bit of juridical hocus-pocus, it has laid the 
foundation of a supreme State and jettisoned one of our best 
hopes for a truly new sort of legal order in the world (moti-
vated, as far as I can tell, largely by an unexamined desire for 
automatic legal uniformity). 
In short, I still contend that when non-absolute, limited gov-
ernments engage in treaty-making, at least one of the follow-
ing three characteristics cannot be part of the resulting treaty 
law: autonomy, supremacy, or direct effect. And it's a good 
thing, too! 
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With best regards, 
Richard Stith 
Professor of Law 
• 
P.S. Yes, I do e-mail (Richard.Stith@valpo.edu), but I'm 
rather slow at typing. 
P.P.S. For your convenience, I am also sending you copies of 
our prior correspondence. 
June 11, 2000 
Professor Richard Stith 
School of Law 
Valparaiso University 
Indiana 
Dear Professor Stith: 
Thank you for responding with such clarity and force to my 
challenge. It may be useful if, following your cue, I first re-
spond to some of the technical issues the trees so to speak-
and then address the forest as a whole. 
As regards the technical issues (the fact that they are tech11ical 
does not make them unimportant. The technical argument is, 
after all, the poetry of our legal discipline), I think I can now 
pinpoint where our differences (and perhaps agreements) lie. 
It is in the passage where you say: 
Even a Treaty such as you describe, which is explicitly . 
intended to have supremacy, autonomy, and direct 
effect, would not have all three of these effects before 
a domestic tribunal. That tribunal would still depend 
on domestic law which means that, whatever the 
substantive outcome domestically, at least the "auton-
omy" of the Treaty would drop out in the course of 
local application. 
I agree with you, but I think you prove too much! Yes, internal 
law would. still be depended upon. And from this fact you 
• 
draw the conclusion that this dependence makes the Treaty 
law not autonomous. As I indicated in my previous letter, 
since I am not sure what "autonomy" means in this context, I 
am willing to agree with this conclusion too. But this is the 
point where our agreement might end. If the mere fact that 
' 
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internal law's being consulted eliminates the autonomy of the 
Treaty, then it would seem to me that no Treaty could ever be 
autonomous. Because when the internal effects of any Treaty 
come to be assessed and applied by a domestic tribunal, no 
matter what the Treaty says (as you cogently argue) a tribunal 
will always have to depend on domestic law to give effect, even 
direct effect or supremacy, to an international treaty. But this 
would be true not only in the case of a Treaty which stipulated, 
as did the one in my example, supremacy, direct effect, and 
autonomy, but also in a Treaty which stipulated, let us say, only 
direct effect and autonomy or only supremacy and autonomy. 
Also, when deciding on the direct effect of this more restricted 
treaty, the tribunal will have to depend on domestic law and 
this, according to your own argument, means that the treaty 
would no longer be autonomous. Now I understood your orig-
inal argument to say that a Treaty may have any two of the 
three attributes (direct effect and autonomy, supremacy and 
direct effect, supremacy and autonomy) but never all three . 
. 
But the only reason you offer why; "my" hypothetical treaty can-
not have all three characteristics is that " [ t] hat tribunal would 
still depend on domestic law which means that, whatever the 
substantive outcome domestically, at least the 'autonomy' of 
the Treaty would drop out in the course of local application." 
If so then it would seem to me that no treaty can ever be au-
tonomous in the internal legal order of a state, since that de· 
pendence on domestic law will always be present by any tribu-
nal applying an international treaty within a domestic legal or-
der. 
This conclusion, I want to emphasize, does not strike me as 
absurd. I can, in fact, see much force in the argument that no 
treaty is truly autonomous in the internal legal order of a State 
(though there could be other possible meanings to autonomy, 
such as when the Treaty exclusively defines the material con-
tent of the obligation). What I cannot accept and do not think · 
yotl have answered is why, if autonomy is possible in a treaty 
that stipulates only direct effect despite the fact that also in 
this type of treaty a domestic tribunal will depend on domestic 
law, it is not possible for such a Treaty to be supreme as well. 
In the last paragraphs of your letter you express your broader 
and normative concerns. I want to address these, too, though 
I fear I cannot quite do it with the same economy of text which 
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you have achieved. I apologize for the length of this reflec-
tion. I want to say at the outset that I do share your normative 
concerns. So I am sympathetic to the reasons behind your 
technical argument, though I still think the argument itself 
does not hold. I think you would be much more persuasive if 
you abandoned your current notion which says that any two 
attributes are possible but never all three, and simply say that 
autonomy is never truly possible so long as law has to be ap-
plied by a domestic tribunal which relies for its authority and 
hermeneutics on a national constitutional order. 
As to the normative argument itself, I do not think there has 
been a more severe critic of the Court of justice in, for exam-
ple, its dismal failure to be an effective federal policeman and 
protect what, in the United States, we would call State Rights. 
I was not Stlrprised to see Justice Breyer of the US Supreme 
Court relying on the ECJ in justifying a far reach of federal law 
in the United States. I have gone so far as suggesting the crea-
tion of a new Constitutional Tribunal, composed of sitting 
judges of the highest C.ourts in each of the Member States (sit-
ting only ad-hoc so they do not become socialized into a Com-
munity ethos) which would decide issues of division of compe-
tences between the EU and its Member States and to take that 
job away from the European Cottrt of Justice! 
And yet, I want to explain why, despite our shared concern for 
limited government, I favor the very special constitutional con-
struct of direct effect and supremacy and why, for the same 
reason of limited government, I am as suspicious of the totalis-
tic claims of some of the national constitutional courts such 
as the German Court in its Maastricht decision as I am of the 
European Court of Justice. 
Modern liberal constitutions are about limitation of power; 
they do articulate fundamental human rights in the best neo-
Kantian tradition; they do reflect a notion of collective identity 
as a Community of Values which is far less threatening than 
more organic definitions of collective identity. But, like the 
moon they, too, have a dark sid~. Very few constitutionalists, 
and practically no modern constitutional court, will make an 
appeal to natural law. Thus their normative authority, from a 
legal point of view, is mostly positivist and is as deep or shallow 
as the last constitutional amendment, which in many Euro-
pean countries is much easier than in the USA. The ease with 
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which we will rally to the defense of the national Constitution 
has a dark side too. Think of the near sacred nature we give to 
Constitutions adopted by the morally corrupted societies of 
the World War II generation. In the new constitutional pos-
ture of national courts in which they hold themselves out as 
defending the core constitutional values of their polity, indeed 
its very identity, there is not only that huge dose of judicial self-
empowerment (which has not always been widely noticed, 
since the national cot1rts cloak themselves as defending against 
the Barbarians at the Gate the ECJ) but also no small mea-
sure of arrogance. Human rights is what provokes the most 
strident rhetoric. But constitutional texts in our different poli-
ties are remarkably similar. Defending the constitutional iden-
tity of the State and its core values turns out in most cases to be 
defending some hermeneutic foible adopted by five judges 
voting against four. The Banana saga is the perfect symbol of 
this farce. There is also an exquisite irony in a constitutional 
ethos which in part is motivated by a distaste of older notions 
of organic identity and yet at the very same time celebrates 
what is an amazing empowerment ·of the unique moral idetl-
tity, wisdom, and, yes, superiority, of the authors of the consti-
tution, the people, and the constittltional demos, when it 
wears the hat of pouvoir constituent. 
What is unique about the European architecture is the fact 
that it demands of the Member States a constitutional disci-
pline, in the concepts of supremacy and direct effect, but de-
mands this withottt a truly Ettropean constitutional founda-
tion, i.e., \Vithout a European Constitution to legitimate it, or 
to put it differently, it demands it withottt ever having constitu-
tional autonon1y. (If yotl and I can agree on this reformula-
tion ofyottr original point, our differences will have vanished). 
Direct Effect and Supremacy without Autonomy create the 
conditions to Europe's most original and foundational princi-
ple:, the principle of Constitutional Tolerance, since they itl-
vite constitutional discipline as a matter of a voluntary act of 
self-negation by the State. They do not "have" to do it. No 
auto11omy. But they should do it! 
Let me explain why. 
Europe was bttilt on the ashes of World War II, which wit-
nessed the most horrific alienation of those thought of as 
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aliens, an alienation which became annihilation. In some re-
spects the European construct was about the prevention of an-
other such carnage: But that's the easy part and it is unlikely 
ever to happen again in Western Europe, thottgh events in the 
Balkans remind us that those demons are still within the conti-
nent. 
More difficult is dealing at a deeper level with the source of 
these attitudes. In the realm of the social, in the public 
square, the relationship to the alien is at the core of decency. 
It is difficult to imagine something normatively more impor-
tant to the httman condition and to our multicultural socie-
• ties. 
There are, it seems to me, two basic human strategies of deal-
ing with the alien and these two strategies have played a deci-
sive role in Western civilisation. One strategy is to remove the 
boundaries. It is the spirit of "come, be one of us." It is noble 
since it involves, of course, elimination of prejudice, of the no-
tion that there are boundaries that cannot be eradicated. But 
the "be one of us," however well intentioned, is often an invita-
tion to the alien to be one of us, by being us. Vis-a-vis the 
alien, it risks robbing him of his identity. Vis-a-vis one's self, it 
may be a subtle manifestation of intolerance. If I cannot toler-
ate the alien, one way of resolving the dilemma is to make him 
like me, no longer an alien. This is, of course, infinitely better 
than the physical annihilation. But it is still a form of danger-
ous internal and external intolerance. 
The alternative strategy is to acknowledge the validity of cer-
tain forms of bounded identity but simultaneously to reach 
across boundaries. We acknowledge and respect difference 
(and what is special and unique about ourselves as individuals 
and groups) and yet we reach across differences in recognition 
of our essential humanity. I never tire of referring to Her-
mann Cohen (1842-1918), the great neo-Kantian philosopher 
of religion, in an exquisite modern interpretation of the Mo-
saic law on this subject \vhich captures its deep meaning in a 
• 
way which retains its vitality even in today's Ever Closer Union. 
It can be summarised as follows: The law of shielding the alien 
from all wrong is ofvital significance. The alien was to be pro-
tected, not because he was a memb.er of one's family, clan, 
religious community, or people; but because he was a human 
being. In the alien, therefore, man discovered the idea of "hu-
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manity." What is significant in this are the two elements I have 
mentioned: on the one hand, the identity of the alien, as 
such, is maintained. One is not invited to go out and, for ex-
ample, "save him" by inviting him to be one of you. One is not 
invited to recast the boundary. On the other hand, despite the 
boundaries which are maintained, and constitute the I and the 
Alien, one is commanded to reach over the boundary and love 
him, in his alienship, as oneself. The alien is accorded human 
dignity. The soul of the I is tended to not by eliminating the 
temptation to oppress but by maintaining it and overcoming 
it. 
Europe represents this alternative, civilising strategy of dealing 
with the "other." This is, more than peace and prosperity, Eu-
rope's true soul. The constitutional expression of this strategy 
is the principle of Constitutional Tolerance and it is encapsu-
lated in that most basic articulation of its meta-political objec-
tive in the Preamble to the EC Treaty: 
Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer 
union among the peoples . of Europe. 
No matter how close the ·Union, it·is to remain among distinct 
peoples. An ever closer union could be achieved by an amal-
gam of distinct peoples into one nation which is both the 
ideal and/ or the de facto experience of most federal and non-
federal states. The rejection by Europe of that One Nation 
ideal or destiny is usually understood as intended to preserve 
the rich diversity cultural and other of the distinct Euro-
pean peoples as well as to respect their political self-determina-
tion. But the European choice has an even deeper spiritual 
• 
meaning. 
An ever closer union is altogether more easy if differences 
among the components are eliminated, if they come to resem-
ble each other, if they aspire to become one. The more identi-
cal the "other'"s identity is to my own, the easier it is for me to 
identify with him and accept him. It demands less of me to 
accept another if he is very much like me. It is altogether 
more difficult to attain an Ever Closer Union if the compo-
nents of that Union preserve their distinct identities, if they 
retain their "otherness" vis-a-vis each other, if they do not be-
come One Flesh, politically speaking. 
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Herein resides the principle of Constitutional Tolerance. In-
evitably I define my distinct identity by a boundary which dif-
ferentiates me from those who are unlike me. My continued 
existence as a distinct identity depends, ontologically, on that 
boundary and, psychologically and sociologically, on preserv-
ing that sentiment of otherness. The call to bond with those 
very others in an ever closer union demands an internalisation 
(individual and societal) of a very high degree of toleration. 
The Leviticus imperative to love thy neighbour as oneself is so 
difficult and hence civilising because that neighbour is not like 
myself. Living Leviticus 23, or Jesus, or, for the secular, the 
Kantian Categorical Imperative is most meaningful when it is 
extended to those who are unlike me. 
It is in legal terms that the principle of Constitutional Toler-
ance finds its deepest and most remarkable expression. The 
European Courts of Justice in Luxembourg and the various 
Member States have enjoined us to accept European law as 
the supreme law of the land. This, despite the fact that at face 
value this law defies the normal pretnise of constitutionality. 
Normally in our polities, we demand constitutional discipline, 
i.e., accepting the authority of a higher law, only within a pol-
ity which understands itself as being constituted of one people, 
however defined, bound by its own constitution adopted with 
due regard to democratic and constitutional processes. De-
manding constitutional obedience without such a constitution 
is usually regarded as subjugation. And yet, in the Commu-
nity, through the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy we 
subject the European peoples to the discipline of a constitu-
tion even though the European polity is composed of distinct 
peoples that do not share a constitution in the normal sense. 
It is a remarkable instance of Constitutional Tolerance to ac-
cept to be bound by a decision not by "my people" but by a 
majority among peoples which are precisely not mine a peo-
ple, if you wish, of "others." I compromise my self-determina-
tion in this fashion as an expression of this kind of internal 
(towards myself) and external (towards others) Constitutional 
Tolerance. 
However there is a big "however" at this point. This, the 
Union's most fundamental principle, that of Constitutional 
Tolerance, becomes a travesty if the norms I follow, if the dem-
ocratic discipline I obey is not adopted by others, my fellow 
' 
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European citizens, with whom I do not share the bonds of 
peoplehood but instead the bonds of a Community of Values 
and a new civic and political culture of transnational toler-
ance, but by a technocratic bureaucracy over which I have lit-
tle control presided over in the unreachable supranational 
Olympus of the European Council (and even European Parlia-
ment) and within the infranational netherworld of 
Comitology. A non-democratic Europe extinguishes the prin-
ciple of Constitutional Tolerance just as a Statal or a One Na-
tion Europe would. And it is an equal travesty if that principle 
of Constitutional Tolerance does not itself accept limits be-
yond which one must not interfere with Member State auton-
omy. 
And that exactly is the weakness of the European Court and 
some of its national counterparts: their scant regard for, and 
weak sensibility to, the democratic processes by which the 
norms which they demand supreme loyalty are enacted, and 
their veritable contempt for meaningful material constitu-
tional limits. It was evident in the Court's historic decisions 
such as Van Gend & Loos where the Court said: 
The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish 
a Common Market, the functioning of which is of di-
rect concern to interested parties in the Community, 
implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement 
which merely creates mutual obligations betwee11 the 
contracting states. This view is confirmed by the pre-
amble to the Treaty which refers not only to govern-
ments but to peoples. It is also confirmed more spe-
cifically by the establishment of institutions endowed 
with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects 
Member States and also their citizens. Furthermore, it 
must be noted that the nationals of the states brought to-
gether in the Community are called upon to cooperate in the 
functioning of this Community through the intermediary of 
the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee. (Recital 10, emphasis added) 
There is something deeply unsettling to present the European 
Parliament and the ECOSOC of 1963 as a chamber that can be 
said to express a meaningful democratic notion of citizen co-
operation in governance and justify rendering laws coming 
out of the Community process obligatory in nature, binding 
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upon States and individuals "[i]ndependently of the legisla-
tion of Member States" (Recital 12). 
This original sin of the Court · (and its acceptance by national 
jurisdictions) may have been justified at the time when the in-
ternational legal nature of the Community was strong and rati-
fication of the Treaty in national parliaments could have been 
considered as an effective means for democratic legitimacy. 
But in today's incredibly complex and wide ranging Commu-
nity, whet?- national ratification after each IGC is an impossible 
Take-it-or-Leave-it pact reminiscent of the worst plebiscites in 
authoritarian regimes and nothing more than a formal act 
rather than a civic exercise of democracy, the continued indif-
ference of the Court to the weak democratic basis of many of 
the norms which it upholds notably in those coming out of 
the Comitology process is more than unsettling: it is an act 
of constitutional abdication. The late Judge Mancini was 
right: The court assumes that respectable democracy-
which is not there. The same could. be said of competences. 
Is it not telling that in its entire jurisprudence of thousands of 
decisions, the European Court has not once struck down a 
Council measure on the ground that it transgressed the juris-
dictional limits of the Community and encroached on State 
Rights? 
Somehow I believe we are not all that far away as regards the 
• 
normative concerns. 
With all good wishes, 
Joseph Weiler 
June 26, 2000 
Professor Joseph H.H. Weiler 
HaiVard Law School 
Cambridge MA 02138 
Dear Professor Weiler: 
' 
Thank you for your gracious and compelling response of June 
11th to my letter of March 6th. There is very litde in it with 
which I would disagree. 
You put matters well in this formulation: 
2002] CAN TREA1Y LAW BE SUPREME 
What is unique about the European architecture is 
the fact that it demands of the Member States a con-
stitutional discipline, in the concepts of supremacy 
and direct effect, but . . . it demands it without ever 
having constitutional autonomy. (If you and l can 
agree on this reformulation of your original point, 
our differences will have vanished). 
Direct Effect and Supremacy without Autono.my cre-
ate the conditions to Europe's most original and 
foundational principle: the principle of Constitu-
tional Tolerance, since they invite constitutional dis-
cipline as a m.atter of a voluntary act of self-negation 
by the State. They do not ''have" to do it. No auton-
omy. But they should do it! 
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Perhaps, given the ambiguous nature of the idea of. "auton-
omy," to which you have drawn attention, I may misunder-
stand you. But I take it that you are pointing to the necessarily 
open, pluralistic, or eveh antinomic nature of European 
Union law, and to th·e resultant principle of Constitutional 
Tolerance (constitutional courts' taking one another into ac-
count) as the only alternative to what you elsewhere have 
called Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Professor 
Antonio Carlos Pereira (University of Santiago de Compos-
tela) makes a similar point when he insists that the true "con-
stitution" of Europe is not just the Treaties, nor just the Trea-
ties and the jurisprudence of the ECJ, but all the formative 
forces at work including, in particular, the key decisions of 
the Constitutional Court of Germany contrary to any claim 
of "autonomy" for the law of the Treaties. · 
If my interpretation of your position is .correct, I am in basic 
agreement, even though I might still prefer a different mix of 
the three terms. More traditional Treaty autonomy along with 
correspondingly less direct effect or supremacy would be more 
coherent and therefore perhaps more stable. This; it seems to 
me, is the less hegemonic (but still successful) approach taken 
by the European Court of Human Rights. 
I also agree that welcoming .the. alien, holding both to the One 
and to the Many, is the core tension to ;be presetved. In a way, 
the ideal type of such community is the family, where the 
greatest love between man and woman, or between parents 
and children, can coexist with a celebration of deep and un-
• 
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bridgeable difference. Contrast this with the bonds of same-
ness we may feel with friends of the same sex and age. But 
catttion: these intrafamily differences are ineradicable, while 
cultural pluralism needs political and other support in order 
to survive. 
Yet you and I may still disagree on the means to our shared 
ends. I think EU hegemony and, beyond that, WTO or the 
like globall1egemony to be the most pressing concern. Rule 
by a deracinated judicial or qt•asijudicial elite, cut off both 
from national traditions and fro_m democratic majorities, is the 
greatest danger. So I rejoice at every sign of resistance, such as 
the Solange I or Maastricht decisions. 
I do not quarrel with your point that national constitutional 
courts may also be "totalistic" and harmful. Indeed, some lec-
tures I gave recently in Spain were entitled "The Problem of 
the Unreasonable High Court" and criticized constitutional 
courts in :general, not jttst the ECJ. But my solution to the 
sometimes too great hubris of national courts is to try to make 
room in the la\-v for regional and other infranational resistance 
against them, 110t to discourage their resistance to suprana-
tional tribunals. 
Perhaps our differences are simply geographic, My main entry 
into European legal thought has been through Spain, while 
yours may have been further ·north. You take quite seriously 
the claims of Maastricht and like decisions and go on, rightly, 
to p·oint out their shortcomings. In Spain, by contrast, Maas;_ 
tricht is hardly taken seriously at all. Prof. Pereira is among the 
few who escape from a univocal, Kelsenian vision of Europe. 
With every good wish, 
Richard Stith 
Richard Stith 
email: Richard.Stith@valpo.edu 
Valparaiso University 
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